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Abstract: The reﬂections regarding risk and industrial catastrophes question
the complexity theories. Besides the new concepts which lead us to question
older concepts (risk, hazard and vulnerability), we propose to think about
more practical aspects, for example the modelling of human behaviour and
the confrontation in crisis situations. The link between concepts as: critical
self-organization, emergence, bifurcation, and the methods in the Distributed
Artiﬁcial Intelligence used to model them is however diﬃcult. In this paper,
we present ongoing analysis on the key concepts of risk science, such as the
hazards and the catastrophes. We propose to enrich them with complex sys-
tems theories. First, we present methodological perspectives of the DAI, for
example multi-agent systems, and compare them with other simulation meth-
ods used in the context of the risks. Secondly, we present the MOSAIIC model
(Modelling and Simulation of Industrial Accidents by Individual-Based meth-
ods) which gives possibilities to simulate the behaviour of individuals during
an industrial accident. The project and the MOSAIIC model aim to explore
the eﬀects of a major industrial accident on public health. For instance, the
emission and the spread of a toxic gas in an urban environment may be a seri-
ous danger for the human health. Thus we propose to study the consequences
of this type of event in order to reduce the vulnerability of the populations.
In the model, we emphasize both on spatial and behavioral dimensions (ie.
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mobility and perception of risk) All these questions lead us to use diﬀerent
methodologies of analysis. For example, concerning mobility, the daily traﬃc
can be simulated at a meso scale: a road axis for example. In that way, we aim
to simulate the global dynamics of the network from the modelling of ﬂows on
arcs of the network (modulated according to the time of day and the day of
week). Yet, we use classical models (for instance equilibrium models) because
they give an ”average image” of the ﬂows of vehicles on the arcs. Based on
this ﬁrst structural mobility, it is then possible to consider ”a change of level”
regarding both the representation and the analysis: if a risk occurs or if a
speciﬁc context disrupts the structure. As a consequence, from a management
of ﬂows on the arc, we turn to an analysis of the individual behaviours in a
multi-agent system.
1 Introduction
We considered risks and hazards from the point of view of complexity, and
especially through the theory of self-organization and critical behaviour. Our
case of study is the diﬀusion of a toxic cloud caused by the explosion of an
industrial plant and its spread in an urban area. The aim of this research is
to study, through modelling, the consequences of this kind of events on the
population and especially on their mobility behaviours, in order to reduce the
vulnerability of networks. If some models, such as ﬂuid dynamics, seem to be
eﬃcient to handle the structural traﬃc in a network, they seem to be less useful
if we aim to model a disrupted situation. Agent-based models oﬀer a solution.
They allow, during the time of the event, to switch from a management of ﬂows
at the level of arc, i.e. the road of a network, to a formalization of behaviours
at the level of the individual. This methodology is more appropriated to deal
with diﬀerent situations, and especially for the analysis of panic for which
nonlinear dynamics are important. Nonlinear means that very small variation
on the model parameters (for example, the number of population susceptible
to panic) have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the evolution of the system (from non-
panic to collective panic), which is qualiﬁed as a bifurcation. In this paper, we
will ﬁrst go back over the concepts of the science of risks, such as hazard and
disasters, that we will reformulate and enrich through the theory of complex
systems. Second, we will present brieﬂy the MOSAIIC project designed to
simulate the behaviour of individuals facing an industrial accident.
2 Risks and complexities
Hazard and vulnerability are two concepts mobilized to deﬁne the risk. After
delimiting them brieﬂy, we will question them in relation to the theories of
complexity, especially that of self-organized criticality [1].
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2.1 The risk, a compound of hazard and vulnerability
Natural, societal or technological risks (R) are essentially tackled through two
key concepts: hazard (A) and vulnerability (V ). The risk is a measure crossing
hazard and vulnerability according to a function R = f(A, V ). In this accep-
tance, and as A. Dauphine´ emphasizes [2] it, a disaster is a reality whereas
a risk is a probability. Hazard is generally deﬁned both as a probability to
occur and as an intensity. Regarding environmental risks, hazard is a measure
which results from the probabilities observed on a long time scale. On the
contrary, regarding technological risks, the probability to occur is less rele-
vant because of the infrequency of these risks and of the theoretical absence
of another occurrence in the future, except if we consider a natural cycle of
Human mistake. In order to put oﬀ this limit, one tries to ﬁnd the conditions
liable to trigger a harmful event for people and equipments. An event tree
analysis can be implemented to identify these causes and eﬀect sequences as
well as to determine theoretical probabilities. The intensity of the phenomena
is the second dimension of hazard. It depends on the duration of this phenom-
ena and of the considered area. This intensity is often employed to deﬁne the
areas of protection surrounding industrial sites for example. The probability
to occur and the intensity are thus the two key elements of studies which deal
with hazard, but both of them become signiﬁcant if the stakes, also called
here the targets, have an interest recognised by a society at a particular time.
This leads us to the second concept linked with risks: the vulnerability. Vul-
nerability generally expresses both the measure of a damage to equipments
and people and the ability of a society to resist a disaster. The determination
of the vulnerability at a global level thus depends on the stakes exposed to a
hazard and on factors of vulnerability (sensitivity of population, resistance of
houses and premises, but also the quality of risk prevention, the management
of disasters with supervision and alarm systems). So, the identiﬁcation of the
stakes potentially important for the system in question is needed: people for
an epidemic, buildings and population for an earthquake, biological factors
for an oil slick...However, the existence of domino eﬀects add diﬃculties to
analyse the stakes. For instance, an earthquake destroying buildings may also
cause victims among their inhabitants and may provoke an industrial accident
whose consequences may be the ﬂow of toxic products in a nearby river. These
multi-risk scenarios are feared, especially in countries like Japan. In order to
take into account this complexity, we can either use synthetic indicators based
on qualitative studies or model and simulate the dynamics of such systems
[3].
2.2 Complexity, bifurcation and resilience
In order to integrate the theories of complexity in the study of risks, we have
to face a major challenge: that of time of processes and their interactions.
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Following the above concepts, risk is deﬁned as a probability of spatial inter-
action between sources and targets. From this deﬁnition, the probability of
setting oﬀ the source is deﬁned as the hazard and the probability of reaction
by the target is deﬁned as the vulnerability (see Figure 1). The complexity
of phenomena implies that risks are interlinked: from the successive interac-
tions, each target may become the probable source of a new event. These
sequences of events both occur through diﬀerent temporalities, and in one or
several territorial dimensions. Risk is thus a spatial and temporal concept.
This approach of risks in a dynamic approach would partly explain the gaps
between the extent and forms of disasters (what is observed) and the extent
and forms of risks (what is probable) that we generally deﬁne with concen-
tric buﬀer zones. In this conception of risk as a spatio-temporal process, it is
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Fig. 1. Interactions between sources and stakes
fundamental to distinguish:
• Hazard, as the probability for a source to change its state in a qualitative
and eventually quantitative way, at a time t. This change of state depends
on the problem: for instance, in the case of an epidemic and at the indi-
vidual level, it refers to the transition from a susceptible to an infected
state;
• Intensity, as a measure of the quantity of energy released by a source
(output), from its change of state and towards the outside. If the reference
period of the study of intensity is relatively short, then we can comprehend
it, not as a simple result, but as a process which describes the behaviour
of energy in time and space. For example, the study of the diﬀusion of a
toxic cloud after its release in the atmosphere;
• Vulnerability, as the probability for a stake to be disrupted by the energy
released by a source, and thus to change its state (qualitatively or quan-
titatively). This probability is the result of a process which describes how
the stake behaves to protect its entrances from the exits of the source, and
the quantity of energy which gets into the stake. For example, the level
of individual’s sensitivity to panic behaviours which are displayed around
him, and thus the probability for him to panic;
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• Resilience, as a measure which describes the ability of the stake to adapt
to change after a disturbance. For example, how individuals recover from
a situation of individual, and eventually collective panic?
This last concept, richer than that of resistance already mentioned, was re-
cently introduced in the literature. Some researchers have suggested, in order
to reduce the damages of disasters and thus to minimize the vulnerability
of exposed elements, to adopt a management strategy of risks based on this
concept of resilience [4, 5, 6]. It can be deﬁned as the ability of a system
to return to a single steady or to a cyclic state after a perturbation. This
concept can thus be useful to analyse the dynamic part of the system, espe-
cially its capacity to ﬁnd new trajectories and rebound after a disturbance.
Such a deﬁnition of risk gives the complexity of the objects considered: they
may be successively sources and targets, and damages may have most of the
time indirect origins with the ﬁrst phenomena. In addition, according to the
type of event, a same structure of interactions between a source and a stake
may be a positive or negative part of vulnerability. The traﬃc network is a
good example. If it is known to be a driving force for an epidemic hazard,
it is however considered as useful for a ﬁre hazard. Therefore, an analysis of
network vulnerability in the ﬁeld of risk studies is fundamental. In the case
of panic phenomena, we ﬁnd this same kind of complexity. In a situation of
panic, the most vulnerable individuals to the intensity of the phenomenon (for
example the diﬀusion of a toxic cloud) can quickly change their behaviours:
from a state of non-panicking population to that of population in panic. If for
the French school on the one hand, the terriﬁed individuals are submitted to
their gregarious instincts and irrational behaviours, for the American school
on the other hand, the individuals keep forms of lucidity, abilities to analyse
the situation and to take decisions: copying the neighbours, escaping... [7].
How irrational individuals may be or not, the non-linear interactions are very
important in the diﬀusion of a panic. A few individuals may spread a panic
among a whole group. The crowd as a whole can then become a source for
other human and technological stakes. The self-organization theory is well
adapted to give an account of the emergence of such phenomena for which
little local disruptions may product global and unpredicted events. The self-
organization theory identiﬁes the principles which allow us to describe how
a system creates his own behaviour at a global level, persisting in time and
space, from the numerous interactions among entities displaying at one or
several lower levels. These interactions are generally local ones, develop in the
vicinity of each other, and such systems are characterized by the absence of
planning: no global control which would pilot such structure, such behaviour,
or such form. These kinds of systems are called ”emergent systems” because
their developments are not fully explained by the properties of entities at in-
ferior levels. As most of natural or technical systems, self-organized systems
are not systems whose equilibrium is permanent. Impermanence is the only
reality of the living world. The activity of a system, dynamic and open to
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the outside like all the living systems, is in evolution. Self-organized systems
arrange their behaviour in relation to certain points in their environments.
Order in an interconnected system of element arises in the vicinity of at-
tractors, which create and maintain patterns within the system. Evolution
between attractors can be cyclic like prey-predator systems. Such systems are
characterized by phases of intense activities: the curves of population linked
to the two groups reversing more or less regularly along the time. Otherwise,
the system can evolve towards a stationary state, converged on a point of
attraction and absorbing progressively its activity. The activity of the system
can lead it through diﬀerent states through the time. This switch from a state
to another is situated close to a point of bifurcation that may lead towards
chaos. In an earlier work, we explored the diﬀerent phases of activity of a
system from the example of the logistic function often linked with diﬀusion
processes [8, 9]. When the system evolves from a bifurcation threshold, the
transition from one state to another qualitatively similar refers us to the con-
cept of resilience. The stability of self-organized systems goes hand in hand
with a possibility of change which explains that all living systems go through
diﬀerent phases during their activities. These phases are theorised by the crit-
icality [1 op. cit.], which shows that all self-organized systems evolve towards
a critical state and that a small and local disruption is suﬃcient to make the
system change. This phase is characterized by a system which goes into a
phase of mutual and global interaction during which the level of connections
and interdependences of the elements of the system is maximal. If they are
useful in a heuristic context, such concepts are however diﬃcult to use when
one wants to apply them or to spot them in an empirical way. How knowing
if a particular system comes from a decentralised context or not? How quali-
fying, identifying the emergent phenomena in such systems? How evaluating
the intensity of relationships between elements at the same level and between
the elements at diﬀerent levels? How measuring resilience in a system? From
measures based on particular methodologies? Systemic measures? Indicators?
These uncertainties lead us to propose simple models of the complexity. This
way of modelling is based on a constructivist approach for which the principle
of parsimony is the crucial point for scientists who wish to tame the ”artiﬁcial
creatures” they build.
3 Simulating panic phenomena: methodological
orientations
The aim of the MOSAIIC project is to study individual behaviours and their
consequences during an industrial accident, and mainly through an analysis
of the traﬃc network vulnerability. The hypothesis of this project is that any
traﬃc system, made of numerous mobile entities in mutual and environmen-
tal interactions, tends to evolve towards a critical state. A small ﬂuctuation
may thus disturb the system toward a phase which considerably increases the
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vulnerability of the persons if the origin of the disturbance, even indirect, is a
technological or natural event. The experimentation in this ﬁeld is of course
either hardly conceivable or diﬃcult to realise. Thus, the modelling methods
and computer simulation oﬀer an interesting option.
3.1 An environment of risk where hazard and vulnerability are
statistically weak
According to Dauphine’s classiﬁcation of risks [2 op. cit.], our case study
belongs to the category of local and short time events. The analysis of tech-
nological disasters is especially relevant today in a context of urban growth
leading to a proximity between residential areas and industrial plants, and
after recent industrial events (AZF in Toulouse, Me`de in Marseille...). The
gap between the dynamics of an observed disaster and the structure of the
risk generally estimated in cities is partly explained by environmental factors.
In urban areas, the variety and the number of sources and targets may grow
in the course of the event. This fact is partly the result of the proximity of
elements and of the growing interactions between them. However, the main
characteristics of these environments for the individuals are both the qual-
ity of buildings to conﬁne and the traﬃc network in order to escape and to
be rescued. As a consequence, based on the conception of risk developed in
2.2, we view global risk as a measure of all the local and contextual risks
that can be observed in a situation, and for which the sequence of interac-
tions is determining for the magnitude of the risk and of the disaster. Thus,
the source is an object partly submitted to hazard and probabilities, whose
outputs are a quantity of energy released (virus, toxic cloud, individual ag-
gressiveness, physical pressure...). This energy moves in space depending on
the nature of the released energy. In order to counter the ﬂows and to prevent
the target stakes from being reached, preventive measures can be taken to
limit the vulnerability upstream: alarms, buﬀer zones, educational measures
etc. The aim is to reduce the inputs to the target objects (stakes). However, if
the quantity of energy coming in the stakes is important, then these last may
have a high probability to become targets. These last will then determine the
outputs towards new stakes (see Figure 1). In this conception of global risk
as a dynamic process in which the sequences of phenomena may be numer-
ous, the MOSAIIC project proposes to focus on individual behaviours and
on vulnerabilities linked to them. Thus in this project stakes and sources are
humans.
3.2 The vulnerability of traﬃc networks during disasters
Studies dealing with vulnerability of systems need to take into account the
constraints that both time and space present. The spatial level has to be
deﬁned. If a disaster may destroy a system, this last is - most of the time - a
subsystem belonging to a bigger system which may not be disturbed by this
8 E. Daude´ et al.
disaster. Once the spatial level of the vulnerable system deﬁned and analysed,
elements and interactions of the system have to be recognized. In this paper,
we will especially focus on the vulnerability of traﬃc networks in order to
estimate its consequences on the exposed populations.
Self-organised and stable systems
The traﬃc networks may be directly or indirectly the origin of a disaster.
For instance, the transport of dangerous materials in inner cities is a factor
which tends to increase hazards. In this case, a mobile source (a truck) is
not submitted to the same types of control and is not classiﬁed in the same
category of risks as a static source (a factory). In addition, the nature and
the quantity of stakes may vary during the shift of the object. An other as-
pect concerns the stakes and the vulnerability, and the need to qualify the
role and to quantify the impact of traﬃc networks on a disaster. The urban
environment is strongly restricted by its traﬃc network and may create use
conﬂicts between the ’active’ or ’passive’ actors of the crisis. As one of the op-
tions to avoid epidemics is to isolate individuals [10], a sound management of
technological disaster would propose to evacuate them out of a perimeter and
then to conﬁne them beyond a security line. However this strategy is rarely
used and, in fact, is diﬃcult to implement. Diﬀerent individual strategies and
behaviours coexist during an accident. We can summarize these strategies by
considering two forces: a centrifugal one (moving away) and a centripetal one
(moving closer) [11]. These two forces, constrained by the reticular environ-
ment which limits the possible paths may produce three types of movement or
ﬂows within the network: a ﬂow in the opposite direction of the source, a ﬂow
towards the source, and a parallel one (the source is a front) or perpendicular
one (the source is a point) to the source. According to the connectivity of the
network1 (see Figure 2) and the area where the event is located, the diﬀerent
types of mobility will be more or less possible in a given perimeter. How char-
acterizing the ”normal” regime of a network and how detecting the change
of this regime toward an exceptional activity? This new regime could be con-
sidered as a precursory sign of dysfunctions in the system, and in our case of
a possible disaster. The average regime observed in a traﬃc network can be
written with a function A. It is an indicator of the level of the functioning of
the system for a time t.
Ai = tmpi − tpi (1)
where tmpi is the average traﬃc on the network at a time i and tpi is the
instantaneous traﬃc on the same network. Within this framework, tmp corre-
spond to a traﬃc modulation on diﬀerent routes which are always the same in
the network and at diﬀerent moments in a day. The global tmp, as shown in
1 we use the connectivity index β [12]which is based on non oriented graphs, and
can be calculated by carrying over the number of nodes (s) to the number of links
(l) : β = l/s
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Fig. 2. Two graph models of a road network
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Fig. 3. Comparison between a diagram of disturbance and a series of daily average
values
the Figure 3, is an average value at diﬀerent hours of the day (continuous line
on the graphic). For example, the tmp indicates the average value of density
for a week day ( for instance at 8am, in the graph from the southernmost point
to the northernmost one) (see Figure 3). We can select a standard day to anal-
yse the variability of situations, and thus to observe the consequences on the
dynamic of a technological accident. Doing this way, we observe three very
diﬀerent types of daily modulations: the working days (JO), Saturday and
the days before oﬃcial holidays (SVF), Sunday and days before oﬃcial holi-
days (DJF)2. This typology emphasizes the intervals between diﬀerent days
at the same hour. In addition, it allows us to compare the average hourly
values between them in order to give a qualitative level of the functioning
of the network: a level of ﬂuidity, for example (horizontal continuous line on
the graphic). At the same level of analysis, the tpi is the traﬃc observed on
2 This parameter (C) is equal to the hourly traﬁc car average on an axes (V MH)
divided by the daily traﬁc car average (V MJ), divided by 24. Thus, C =
V MH/(V MJ/24), this parameter has an average equal to 1.
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the network, measured ’in live’ during the simulation. So if the tmp is an
estimation calculated from a counting during a period of time, then the tpi
is the traﬃc in the network, or in a path, observed at a given moment. For
example, the tp8 value indicates that at 8am on the 2nd of August, n vehicles
are in the graph from the southernmost point to the northernmost one. As a
consequence, if the At value is positive, the traﬃc on the section is, on aver-
age, higher at this hour and during this type of day, than the traﬃc recorded
at the moment i. On the contrary, if Ai is negative, the traﬃc, observed at
the moment i on the network, is higher than the average traﬃc. The advan-
tage of such a formalization is to show, at which moment the system enters
in a disrupted phase, the duration of this phase, its intensity and at which
moment the system recovers its stable regime. Such a diagram presents our
conception of the traﬃc network: a complex, stable and partly self-organised
system whose dynamic is independent from the entities which constitute it.
Although the entities (cars, pedestrians), may change, the laws which organise
it remain. Yet, there is an autonomy of the traﬃc in relation to its constituent
elements. The existence of dynamic independent patterns at a meso level of
the network will lead us to model this dynamic at a meso level: for exam-
ple with diﬀerential equations. But how switching from this modelling of the
dynamic at a meso level to a modelling at a level where micro-changes have
impacts on the global functioning?
Phases of criticalities
Why a system may move from a attraction point to another one and thus
globally move away from the average observed traﬃc? Our hypothesis is that
changes of aims and motivation within a group of individuals favour this
bifurcation. These individual changes will be all the more quickly transmitted
to the whole people (a total correlation between the elements of the system
[1 op. cit.]) since they will be constrained by a network and a territory whose
capacities of adaptation on a so short period is nearly non-existent. Only few
entities have to change their behaviour to produce feedback eﬀects on a part
or on the whole system. Yet, its properties may be changed partly, temporally
or on a long term basis. This criticality of the system is all the more high since
we are situated, in the space of parameters, in a zone of instabilities which
are characterised for example by a level close to congestion. The possibility
for the system to bifurcate is all the more high since the degree of freedom of
the entities in the system is weak, and since interdependence becomes global.
In our case, that means that hazard and vulnerability factors are all the more
important since the number of individuals circulating in the network and
in the urban area is high. The diagram in Figure 4 presents these ideas. It
combines the density (number of vehicles on an x axis) and the ﬂow (number
of vehicles along an y period of time). This diagram is in general estimated
and observed on small intervals of space and time, in order not to combine
diﬀerent states of traﬃc. So the density is low if the individuals adopt the
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speeds of their choices only limited by statutory constraints. On the contrary,
if both the density or the rate of occupation of the way rises, the traﬃc is more
and more constrained and, beyond a certain limit - a critical density (Kc) -
it reaches the congestion. We plan to model the micro level dynamics close to
this threshold: for example, the variable of density will be converted into a list
of agents on the relevant axes. In a next step, we will deﬁne the properties,
methodologies, aims or strategies of these agents. The state of traﬃc thus
 
Flow (Q) 
Qmax. 
KC Kmax. Density (K) 
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V 
Free-flow 
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Fig. 4. Parabolic diagram: estimating congestion with ﬂow and density
goes through diﬀerent points, a possible trajectory leading to Kmax: points of
attraction which indicate a full saturation of the road, or even of the network.
The network resilience is thus the ability of the network to move to a point
of attraction below the critical threshold Kc: a point that we plan to discover
thanks to the analysis of the behaviour of the agents.
4 Conclusion
The analysis of the network vulnerability, measured by its trend to maintain
a phase of global disturbance, proposes to stress one of the elements of com-
plexity of disasters: the interactions between individuals and territory as well
as between individuals and individuals. Despite this paper as well as the MO-
SAIIC project both focus on a particular category of risk, these reﬂections
may lead us to suggest a more general model dealing with human behaviours
in situations of crises. Thus, this model may be applied to other categories of
risks that imply population shifts in strongly constrained spaces. Such a model
oﬀers an opportunity to test a great variety of behaviour scenarios as well as to
analyse the incidence of the network structure on behaviours. Besides these
diﬀerent tests, we plan to study to which extent individual behaviours are
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likely to lead towards a critical point, even during situations when events oc-
cur far away from a critical phase. At last, this project plans to provide a
cartography of the diﬀerent strategies possible in contexts of crises to decision
makers and people dealing with the problem of crisis management: evacua-
tion strategies by getting closer to potentially disaster zones or strategies of
intervention by mapping routes that allow to reach the targets.
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